Hugh Inevitably the forces at play work against each other to some degree. A DAO can be a hybrid of both and still represent autonomy. The authority to create such a dynamic can be a function of the DOA. Revisiting the structural authority given to certain roles or individuals can happen regularly as a check valve. It is all possible with the right intent and conscent.
Request for Comment: Internal Governance Model [KIP-19]
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Hugh One of the primary concerns I have read about is a lack of quantitative support for making these decisions and a clear framework to guide the resulting decision making process should this pass.
I have no doubt concerns about efficiency and organization structure are real so I would like to vote for an option that essentially says “No, but come back with a less vague proposal supported by quantitative analysis and metrics.”
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To start off with some context: I joined the DAO at the end of December into the Community Dept. Upon joining I did find there was a lack of structure in the DAO and processes. Most projects (whether product, platform or general operations) were completed in silo groups which didn't necessarily make use of the structure of the different dept's which were already apparent. There did seem to be a culture of getting things done but less was done on the planning side or attempting to choose the right resources/skill sets to deliver on the project. Despite the somewhat less normal corporate environment I've been used to, there is no doubt that product was delivered, work was done and more processes were put in place to enable better effeciency.
- Context for the proposal, including a brief explanation of the challenges facing the DAO, and the key strategic initiatives we are currently pursuing;
For one of the few who was quite vocal for having better alignment and the need for strategic objectives, I totally agree with the need for these to ensure we are aligned with what we are aiming for in the short-term, medium-term and long-term. This will not only ensure we can pull on the right resources to deliver on the objectives but also ensures we can measure our success based on these targets. Contrary to this, our current setup encourages anyone with a good idea to run with it, try to gather people to support it and if it is delivered then it is compensated for - this did create conflict around priorities especially when most projects demanded more capacity from certain departments.
- An articulation of the roles, responsibilities and delegated decision authority for key individuals within the DAO, including Core Team, Functional Stewards, the Policy Team, and Internal Contributors;
I agree with the need to articulate roles and responsibilities (all all levels of the DAO) but not necessarily delegated decision authority (will explain after) for all members of the DAO (including Core, Functional Stewards, Policy Team and Internal Contributors). This ties in with the objectives point so the DAO can really ensure it has the appropriate skill set to deliver on the necessary objectives and can also measure and manage it's operational budget based on what it needs to deliver. For individuals, I can only speak for myself as an internal contributor. Responsibilities are important to ensure specific tasks are carried out by those who have been identified as having the relevant skillset to complete the task effeciently or with higher success - avoiding the situation where anyone has the right to try to run a project. It also allows myself to know what the DAO is asking of me, I can measure my worth based on the time, experience and success of meeting those responsbilities and expect an appropriate compensation.
On the point around delegation, I do believe there are risks around centralising decision rights to Core Team and Functional Stewards. While I agree it does help us move at pace (a small group or individual making decisions vs a decentralised approach of voting) the risks are amplified for internal contributors due to little progress or solid commitment to improve transparency from Core Team and Functional Stewards. As an example, transparency was requested around allocations across the DAO - this resulted in allocations being shared for internal contributors but no Core or Functional Stewards (maybe 1/2) were shared. While there are concerns around doxxing wallets if Core/Functional Stewards are shared, this raises concerns around different rules applying at different levels. Ultimately, I feel centralising decision rights is the way to go in our current journey to move faster however the transparency needs to be worked on more to mitigate the risks to internal contributors prior to formal agreement - we can work on this quite quickly but there is certainly a lack of trust looming at all levels (internal contributors, functional stewards AND core).
To note also, since there has been nothing formally confirming the decision rights one may argue that Core are currently assuming specific decision rights (known as status quo).
- A proposal to establish a working group dedicated to building out a decentralization roadmap for the DAO.
100% agree with this approach with establishing a working group to build out an appropriate DAO for KlimaDAO. However this is dependent on the mitigation of risks around the proposal of formalising the current centralised approach.
My overall stance is that I will go with the majority vote regardless and will continue to work on or promote changes to work towards what I believe will help the DAO succeed it's objective/mission while establishing a working environment that I would strive and enjoy. To me, none of the change requests are necessarily red flags or against my morales but certain options will require more trust which should warrant more accountability and responsibilities from those asking for it.
I‘m extremely confused by the poll options and the comments. voting „for“ sounds like voting for decentralization but this, it seems, is not the case.
I’m actually in agreement with @GolanTrevize and his points. this seems to be a consolidation of power. also, I find it telling that core and council salaries have not been published as of yet. that’s not really the ethos of a DAO
flippi Council was getting paid 15k/mo and is now being reduced by 30% at a minimum to support DAO treasury runway. Core we're allotted pKLIMA which was announced when KlimaDAO first began and is in the Medium. Moving forward we will be posting a proposal for operational budget with per dept numbers that the community needs to sign off on. As for Core, they never have or will be compensated from the DAO treasury.
flippi Contributors are held accountable through their teams and leads. It doesn't make sense for every department be held accountable to every other department across the board in the current process state/structure of the DAO. What is trying to be implemented are multi-functional Project Process best practices to increase visibility and accountability. This will be reinforced through a cemented agreement between contributor and DAO on their roles and it's key responsibilities.
I am sorry, but the second paragraph is objectively incorrect. At this time leadership roles are not subject to democratic input from the Contributor body. They are delegated from the top and there is currently little if any recourse for accountability.
It is becoming clearer from reading the comments and speaking with investors, there is lot of misunderstanding of this proposal and the currently functionality of the DAO. I believe more time and transparency is need in order for investors to make an informed decision in their best interest.
pitbullish There will always be some vagueness when a proposal is written for the operations of the DAO to token holders that don't work in the DAO.
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Contributors that have joined the DAO more recently are being held accountable by their leads and sometimes their peers. What accountability measure might this KIP introduce for Core and Council members?
I agree that full transparency is not always practical or competitive, however I do think any KIP involving major DAO frame work, should have some form of frame work for balancing guarding proprietary information and disclosing enough information for investors to make informed decisions.
pitbullish Just as the contributors are held accountable by their team, the Core and Council are held accountable by their team members. Just because there isn't full transparency to every work stream everywhere for everyone all the time doesn't mean there is a lack of contribution. With that said we will move toward more transparency, I'm just trying to manage expectations.
I'm "For" proposal, let's go!
json your last sentence doesn’t give the full picture
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Conflating transparent top down accountability for some Contributors and opaque horizontal transparency is a false equivalence, especially when missteps by Core members can be devastating to the DAO. There must be a mechanism to ensure that the fittest and most excellent candidates fill important roles of the DAO. I personally do not believe that a relatively small group choosing amongst them selves behind closed to doors is a recipe for insuring the cream rises to the top.
GolanTrevize It's a stepwise and iterative process. Despite your misgivings and misunderstanding of the proposal this is the beginning of a conversation and path toward what is best for the protocol's future and ultimately the token/token holders.
pitbullish it isn't scalable for everyone to know everything all the time all day. A police of the police of the police. What is the value add for Department A to know everything Department B does at all times? I truly truly think that accountability will be heightened with multi-functional project accountability framework which is what is trying to be implemented. What you're pushing for is actually going to happen but in a different, more effective way.
pitbullish
There are many members in core that have been working in the ReFi space before the term existed, and in some cases have put years into aligning VCM participants with the vision that we're working towards - a robust, transparent, and more efficient on-chain carbon market. The people that co-founded KlimaDAO, and our advisory group, are those that have quite literally helped create this space. That being said, 'core' was never meant to be an immutable group of individuals. That is why we've already expanded it and nearly doubled its ranks since the DAO was launched last October. Individuals that excelled in their craft and demonstrated dedication to our vision were brought in (e.g. Sy, Brian, Leontari, etc).
We consulted with our advisors and those that worked in the departments where each of these members worked before having conversations with the aforementioned individuals about their thoughts on joining us. You may believe this was done 'behind closed doors' but I assure you the feedback from many in the community was paramount to our decision making process.
Let me remind everyone reading this thread that this KIP is but a first step in what will be an iterative process toward developing the most effective DAO processes and structure moving forward. The line between 'de jure' and 'de facto' in terms of our processes currently is extremely blurred and not straightforward. This KIP is the first step in bringing clarity for all stakeholders, and personally, I hope pragmatism prevails here.
Lastly, while I'm somewhat disheartened to see so much negativity being thrown around in this debate, I respect the conviction of our community members and believe ultimately following our vision and engaging in healthy debate will move us forward productively.
Good points brought up here on both sides but I support increasing the formality of the organization. This actually leads to greater levels of transparency and accountability. The problem I am seeing with attempts at full decentralization is that people naturally gravitate into power groups to shape the community at large opinion on important matters. So this is not actually decentralized in a sense. These power groups can be opaque (DM groups outside of servers) and so conflict of interests are difficult/impossible to assess. Most DAOs have a core group that is in the know and making moves/connecting with outside orgs for partnership opportunities. Basically announcing their work to the community, often without voting. Not everything needs to be voted on but I think Klima has been very good about community governance from the start.
The very meaning of decentralization is unclear. There is always some example that is more decentralized. We have not identified the fundamental smallest building block of decentralization.
Other point is that some web3 should be more decentralized than others. I think the more ongoing development necessary the less decentralized it is. Full decentralization would imply that the whole community is essentially directing the coding process line by line, or at least fully capable of reviewing the code and commenting/voting on it. That just isn't practical so we have to delegate development authority. Same with partnership and marketing decisions. We don't vote to email a major company to see if they are interested and we don't vote on whether to release a press release with a new partnership. These activities are implied to be necessary in KlimaDAO function. Similarly, as a community member I expect the DAO organization to use contributors to their maximum potential vs many pulls in different direction. While the DAO has been doing really well, this was due to extreme commitment from a few individuals who put in major hours to organize the DAO then also deal with disgruntled contributors. What they are asking is a formal process for this, which is appropriate. The way HR has been done over the past 4-5 months is not sustainable.
If all Klima was is the base protocol with no proposed changes, then full decentralization is probably appropriate. But Klima has major growth ambitions. We want to go from $90m market cap to being the center of a several billion (trillion?) market within years. That is major growth. So it stands to reason that Klima should take some org attributes of a tech start up.
The basic thing here is that KlimaDAO has been running since October and this KIP can be looked as a way to incorporate lessens learned and improve efficiency. This doesn't affect the flow of KIPs and what rises to the level of a KIP.
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Accountability does not need to be scalable from a top down perspective. I am suggesting that it should be cyclical. As some contributors are held accountable via top down hierarchy, those at the top should be help accountable by bottoms up democracy. Again I agree that full transparency is not practical.
I am glad to hear that there is some form of framework for accountability being developed, if it is in fact more effective than what I have suggested, I will certainly vote for it. I think that it should definitely be included in the KIP, so investors can make informed decisions.
I am glad there has been more process in selecting core members than I was aware of. I believe that would also be important framework to include in the KIP. Is there also a process for accountability/removal if a core member is found to be unfit for their duties? .If accountability for core members can only be determined by other core members, what safeguards can be applied to defend against cronyism in the future? To be clear I am not suggesting that is currently taking place.