ShimonD

  • Sep 25, 2023
  • Joined Jan 14, 2022
  • I support this initiative and I couldn't be more proud of KlimaDAO. To put this in context, the treasury has 6.2m idle usdc, not including klima/usdc and bct/usdc liquidity. 1.5m for such a grand investment makes sense.
    Greater diversity of credits onchain will lead to more choices and more demand.
    KlimaDAO will be supporting both the demand side and the supply side of the onchain VCM.

  • I think an exploratory discussion sounds like a good idea. I'm not clear exactly what kind of data would be collected/used and how it could help, but I'd love to hear where this can go. If this could help put Klima on the radar of climate scientists and/or people on the ground who work on climate change solutions, then I would love to support the initiative.

    • Very well written proposal, and I'm voting "For".
      It is worth also noting that the NCT treasury reserves fully cover this initiative, and the treasury currently owns 109.9k NCT.

    • My first thought - this is a cool idea and I love it.
      I can see how partial locked wsklima compensation can align incentives better long term while also reducing sell pressure from compensations.

      However, on second thought I have some concerns.

      1. There are contributors who work full time for KlimaDAO and depend on 100% of their pay for bills. It would be counter-productive to inconvenience those people who we need most in these times. See reply from @goats_on_drugs-5 for instance.
      2. We have a dwindling contributor runway of Klima (KIP-24), making it hard to pay in Klima at all going forward until we regain more premium.

      If this was proposed a few months ago, #2 wouldn't have been an issue, and we would only need to tackle #1.
      I would love to hear thoughts from Operations on these concern and whether or not we can mitigate them to get some of the benefits of this approach.

    • MarcusAurelius These general directions all make sense. I guess as I understand it, the short answer is that some of these parameters are not formally defined because the framework is new and may require adjustments. I'm also gathering from this that the inverse bond capacity, when/if introduced, might be large enough to justify a 66% AKR drop.

      This all sounds great, and I'm happy to err on the conservative side during these market conditions to ensure Klima's long term success.

      One last point. I think it would be good to explicitly add the following portion of your comment to @CryptoLife to the KIP: "each specific change to the target AKR made within this framework will still be put to a KIP vote". This way, we can ensure that the community will analyze and stamp the seal of approval on every proposed Policy move within this new framework.

    • I think that giving flexibility to Policy to adjust AKR up or down based on the overall onchain carbon market is undoubtedly a great improvement. It also makes complete sense to adjust AKR down right now as a first step.

      Before I vote in favor, I have a few questions:

      1. From 300% AKR to "100% once either inverse bonds are introduced or regular bonds are shut off" - what is the justification here?
      2. "The magnitude of the increase or decrease is in proportion to the ratio." - could this be formalized or expanded upon?
      3. How would bonding capacities be adjusted in tandem?
      • Besides negligible added smart contract risk, there may also be opportunity cost.

        Staking up to 50% of each eligible treasury asset seems a bit high to me given that the space is so young. It's fine if the lock period is sufficiently short.
        Opportunity cost may include unknown unknowns - for example, we may want to disband some Klima/USDC for liquidity initiatives, or stake Klima/USDC elsewhere, depending on C3's fate.
        Depending on the lock period, this may be a bigger cost than expected.

        A 60 day lock would have a very different risk analysis than a 1 year lock.

        Given the "up to 50% of each eligible treasury asset" bullet point, I recommend adding Policy's lock period intentions to the KIP to clarify opportunity cost risk.
        I would also prefer the range of "up to 50% of eligible treasury assets" to be narrowed a bit to the intended range.

        I am voting "for" with the hope that my comments are taken into consideration when crafting the KIP.

        • I agree with the reasoning in the reply by @IBuyShitCoins .

          I will be voting No, and I will happily vote Yes in the future after resolution of loose ends with the current NCT supply.

          1. I do not agree that KlimaDAO should be buying back value extracted from it.
          2. The decision to extract the tco2s necessary to mint the first NCTs was highly centralized, and it doesn't sit well with me that the decision to rightfuly reimburse KlimaDAO this value is arbitrarily and conveniently made to be the first decision pushed off to the Toucan community.