I support this KIP aiming to further accelerate KlimaDAO's mission to fight climate change. Clear boundaries and responsibilities are important and formalizing them is vital. Perfect is the enemy of good and there is no perfect DAO structure. KIP-19 outlines appropriate steps to lay the groundwork for optimal decentralization without sacrificing the urgency of our mission.

1) When it is said Core is paid by “independent funding” how was this raised? I guess it was by selling pKLIMA? In that case, I wouldn’t call it “independent” since it is paid for by the dilution of Klimates. Since now on a more limited select number of Contributors will be retained with regular compensation, I believe it better aligns incentives for that funding to be allocated to the DAO wallet from which Core is paid as well. Then Core has the direct shared incentive to best manage the DAO wallet.

2) Since KlimaDAO is being managed like a startup now, like Hugh said and we need to “ruthlessly prioritize,” KlimaDAO time-bound KPIs should be published very soon. That’s the only way we can judge if Core or Stewards are not “performing their duties.”

3) If departmental Contributors’ compensation will be published (as it should), Core’s & Steward’s compensation should be included.

4) Staffing of the Decentralization Working Group should either be: (A) voted on entirely on by the community; or at least (B) each group votes for its own representatives.

    Voted in favor.

    I still think outlining some of what is NOT controlled by these centralized resources would be a huge benefit to both transparency and protecting the decentralized nature of a DAO.

    Presented as "Anything not specifically assigned to these members in NOT in their pervue. Some examples include, but are not limited to [insert some examples]" would be great.

    This seems even more important given the information conversation held when the last forum discussion was posted as no one seems to agree what a DAO is nor whether decentralization is important and, if so, how much and which pieces should be decentralized.

    I'd also suggest finding a more random way to add SOME members to the decentralization working group. As described, it will simply be a centralized group of the "in crowd." In my experience (running multi million dollar budgets, projects, and companies), even those with zero experience in a topic, or who you think might not be helpful often have the greatest insights. I've gotten push back against this my whole career, but it almost always gives great results (success depends on the ones running the group ensuring that it works well, so it's really a mark on the group organizers).

    In the end, I'm not too worried about it. I'd just like the price to go up and the carbon mission to succeed.

      After the latest office hours and the addition of some improvements to the proposal I'll change my vote to a "For".

      However, I'd like to see transparency further increased in the short-term, especially in relation to budgets and compensation of contributors. IMO there's no reason why this can't be done in the short-term, as opposed to the longer-term nature of the decentralisation process.

      I'm also very curious about the "independent funding and a multiyear runway" of the Core Team.
      Can anyone shed some light into where these funds come from without getting into specifics that can't be disclosed in public?
      Do they come from initial VC investment into the project? Personal funds from each member? Somewhere else?

      Overall I'm very happy with the process that followed the heated discussions going on in the forum and discord and I'm eager to follow the developments and be as involved as possible in the decentralisation roadmap🌲🌲 !

        Growthex good point, we considered including a clause like this in the KIP but didn't think it was necessary since we are delegating specific decision-making authorities that primarily impact the internal governance of the DAO contributors (not governance of the treasury or policy decisions). No new powers are being delegated to the Policy team, we're just clarifying the status quo powers that have been retained by the Policy team (some since launch, others delegated by previous KIPs).

        Something like this was what I was going to throw in, but thought it would be obvious based on the status quo:

        Only those decision making authorities specifically delegated within this KIP would be within the purview of the delegated groups if passed. Any powers not explicitly delegated (for example, adding new bond types, allocating treasury funds to strategic initiatives, utilization of yet-to-be-allocated DAO pKLIMA) remain subject to a KIP vote, until/unless a KIP specifically delegates those powers.

        Honestly I think we can slip this in as a disclaimer into the final KIP on Snapshot since it doesn't materially change the content of the KIP.

          vitalPixel glad to hear the difficult process of coming to consensus hasn't discouraged you!

          In terms of Core Team's funding model, I would encourage you to revisit this blog post outlining the role of pKLIMA in our ecosystem: https://www.klimadao.finance/blog/pklima-aligning-incentives-for-long-term-success

          This article also addresses point 1) of your comment @GolanTrevize - Core Team incentives are already aligned for long term success of KlimaDAO. Tying Core pay to the DAO wallet would only compromise the ability of the Core Team to carry the project forward if the DAO wallet were to run dry. Not to mention the fact that it would burn through the DAO wallet even more quickly, since that would mean 14 more contributors would be getting paid out from the DAO wallet.

            GolanTrevize to your other points:

            1) Addressed in my comment above

            2) Yes definitely, quantitative KPIs are important, but we want to be careful about falling into the trap of "what gets measured gets managed", so it's important we are thoughtful and deliberate about tying specific KPIs to the performance of specific individuals.

            We already publish top-level treasury stats on a weekly basis (CC, TTV, and MC/TTV) and we have an extensive set of Dune dashboards - so the question now is which metrics should be tied to which functions and how much should we weigh the quantifiable metrics vs. the un-quantifiable subjective value added by each contributor. Looking forward to detailed discussion of appropriate KPIs in the #governance channel in Discord!

            3) We will not publish exact compensation amounts for any contributor. This would be tantamount to doxxing their wallets. If individual contribs wish to share their pay, of course that is totally fine - but we will always make our best effort not to doxx anyone's wallet. However, as outlined in the revised text of this KIP, we will publish budgets for all teams that draw from the DAO wallet, as well as detailed spreadsheets of the value delivered and estimated hours worked for each contributor across all teams (like those Krian and I published for Policy and Engineering in Discord #general chat).

            Given the burden of leadership and the large number of workflows Core & Stewards typically are involved in, we will likely stick to general role descriptions like those we published for Core & Stewards in this KIP and for Core the detailed roles outlined in the linked document.

            However, since Core & Stewards will be responsible for giving the quarterly community updates, that will also be an opportunity for the community to get insight into what they have each personally been involved in. I'm also thinking we should go back to the scheduled office hours approach where we have one "guest" Core or Steward to share what they or their team are specifically working on in the past few weeks.

            4) I look forward to discussing the appropriate selection criteria for this in the #governance public chat. For the community delegates specifically, I'm very keen to source outside perspectives that have relevant experience scaling and decentralizing DAOs. I personally think it's important we set a high bar for inclusion on the decentralization working group to make sure everyone in the group comes with relevant context and expertise, and is committed to diligent research and thoughtful deliberation.

                MarcusAurelius thanks for your replies fren.

                For (1) speaking as just a KLIMA holder (aiming for network value and climate action maximization), this is the area that concerns me. Not specific against the Core or Stewards, but generally how accountability and incentives alignment are key ingredients for success. I’ve never heard of a startup where the Board or C-Suite is paid from a separate capital bucket. Sometimes it is even the reverse, where founders will pay employees ahead of paying themselves. To be the best steward of the DAO wallet, Core should tie their income to it. We will gain for the DAO wallet whatever the amount is (which no one knows) that was raised for Core via pKLIMA. Combined with contributor cuts, that will already extend the DAO runway to evaluate other fundraising options (non-dilutive NFT sale, dilutive VC raise, temporarily increasing bonding or offset fees, etc.). Over time as KLIMA becomes more valuable with larger volumes, funding the DAO wallet should be less of an issue. Right now is the time when we should be investing in people and initiatives to spin up the flywheel of adoption and network effects.

                I also note that no startup has succeeded in the conditions that KlimaDAO will now operate, nor MakerDAO or other earlier generation DAO examples the team gave in the last RfC.

                Startups and DeFi 1.0 protocols have doxxed teams, investors, advisors whose reputations are on the line. For a startup, the founders are directly overseen by an independent board with fiduciary obligations and shareholders with clear legal/contractual rights. They are funded progressively based on achieving certain GTM milestones and KPIs. The startup founders/employees are illiquid until success, either an exit or IPO. (And compensation of Board & C-Suite usually are approved by Shareholders & Board.)

                KlimaDAO doesn’t have any of that, and I understand pKLIMA can be redeemed based on expanding supply, regardless of network value or product/platform KPIs, and of course is then liquid. And apparently the anon Core can be funded for “years,” so that combined with this KIP-19, has total autonomy. Sure, the Core wants a higher value of KLIMA, but even for KLIMA holders to exercise last resort authority, we’d struggle to pass any KIP without Core / early investors’ support.

                Just keep all this in mind that KIP-19 requires huge trust in Core/Council without the normal checks and balances and optimal incentive alignment with which startups / crypto projects normally succeed with. Prudent management of the treasury is a condition of our success, but driving adoption of KLIMA is the necessity. I’d advocate that the DWG go ahead asap so like @Sirob wrote, we can unlock the creativity of the DAO as a network for us to succeed, rather than relying on a flawed startup model for our situation that seems like fitting a square peg in a round hole.

                For (2) while individual KPIs are always best (and I hope given the new centralized stucture the DAO would implement them), I think given our new approach DAO-wide KPIs are needed for both the “Product” and “Platform.” There are some natural candidates here, so look forward to what the DAO leadership proposes.

                For (3) I had understood from this revised KIP-19 text, each department of contributors collectively (not individually) having their compensation published. Why is the Core excluded from that? Even if Core for now isn’t paid directly from the DAO wallet, they are paid from the pKLIMA fundraise it seems, so that’s coming from the value of the DAO?

                For (4) okay with setting qualifications affirmed by the community, ideally so long as they’re not too exclusionary. To make sure we recruit the best of the community, I’d suggest the community DWG members are paid in KLIMA for their work.

                Wish you best of luck 🍀 🌳,🌳

                  Real structure is needed just like any organization. I want to see this company grow in the right direction for the next 2-10 years and that can only happen with the people internally running it efficiently without hang ups. Crypto moves fast as some stated earlier and this is everyone’s money we are dealing with so I would want decisions made internally to prolong klima.

                  Road never flat do our best never get more.I support this KIP，

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